Goergen, M. Renneboog, L.D.R. Zhang, C. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract
As institutional investors are the largest shareholders in most listed UK firms, one expects them to monitor the firms they invest in. However, there is mounting empirical evidence which suggests that they do not perform any monitoring. This paper provides a new test on whether UK institutional investors engage in monitoring. The test consists of an event study on directors? trades. If institutional shareholders act as monitors, their monitoring activities convey new information about a firm?s future value to other outside shareholders and reduce the informational asymmetry between the managers and the market. As a result, directors? trades convey less information to the market, and the stock price reaction is weaker. However, our results show that institutional shareholders do not have any significant impact on the stock price reaction which stands in marked contrast with the impact that families, individuals and other firms have on stock prices.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
2008-38.
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