This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Managers, Firms and (Secret) Social Networks: The Economics of Freemasonry

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Braggion, F. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper studies the relationships between managers? a? liations with Freema- sonry and companies' performance. Using a unique data set of 410 companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange between 1895 and 1902, I find that Masonic managers were associated with greater access to credit in small and young companies whose se- curities where traded over the counter. These companies earned higher profits, but the effect is not statistically significant. On the other hand, large publicly quoted corpora- tions that were managed by Freemasons did not obtain greater access to credit; they had lower profiys and lower Tobin's Q. These findings help to understand how social networks are related to companies' performances. Although social networks help to resolve agency problems between lenders and borrowers in firms that have difficulties in obtaining debt finance, in larger publicly quoted companies they are associated with worse agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and with worse economic performance.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=74842
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Corry Stuyts)
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-36.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200836

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mokyr, Joel, 2005. "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(02), pages 285-351, June. [Downloadable!]
  2. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-89, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marianne Bertrand & Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Network Effects And Welfare Cultures," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 1019-1055, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Laurence Booth, 2001. "Capital Structures in Developing Countries," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 87-130, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Giorgio Topa & Stephen Ross & Patrick Bayer, 2005. "Place of Work and Place of Residence: Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes," Working Papers 05-23, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Cooley, Thomas F & Marimon, Ramon & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy, 2007. "The Small World of Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns," NBER Working Papers 13121, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Long, Jason, 2005. "Rural-Urban Migration and Socioeconomic Mobility in Victorian Britain," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(01), pages 1-35, March. [Downloadable!]
  14. Rui Albuquerque & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2004. "Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 285-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. " The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2000. "Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 1-33, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Roger Burt, 2003. "Freemasonry and business networking during the Victorian period," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 56(4), pages 657-688, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Esther Duflo & Emmanuel Saez, 2003. "The Role Of Information And Social Interactions In Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence From A Randomized Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 815-842, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Booth, James R. & Deli, Daniel N., 1996. "Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 81-104, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 2007. "Surviving Andersonville: The Benefits of Social Networks in POW Camps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1467-1487, September.
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.