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Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma

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Author Info

  • Miettinen, T.
  • Suetens, S.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

In this paper we measure experienced guilt in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with pre-play communication. We find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. We also find that fining unilateral defection reduces feelings of guilt.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-12.

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Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200812

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: cooperation; guilt; experiments; prisoner’s dilemma; pre- play communication;

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Cited by:
  1. Masahiro Shoji, 2014. "Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-923, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  2. Hongbin Li & Mark Rosenzweig & Junsen Zhang, 2008. "Altruism, Favoritism, and Guilt in the Allocuation of Family Resources: Sophie's Choice in Mao's Mass Send Down Movement," Working Papers 965, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  3. Bracht, Jürgen & Regner, Tobias, 2013. "Moral emotions and partnership," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 313-326.
  4. López-Pérez, Raúl, 2012. "The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 642-658.
  5. Sebastian J. Goerg & Jan Meise & Gari Walkowitz & Eyal Winter, 2013. "Experimental Study of Bilateral Cooperation Under a Political Conflict: The Case of Israelis and Palestinians," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 04-01, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, revised 21 Oct 2013.
  6. Topi Miettinen, 2006. "Promises and Conventions - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  7. DECLERCK, Carolyn H. & BOONE, Christophe & KIYONARI, Toko, 2011. "No place to hide: When shame causes proselfs to cooperate," Working Papers 2011018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  8. Donja Darai & Silvia Grätz, 2010. "Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma," SOI - Working Papers 1006, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2010.
  9. Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen & Daniel Houser, 2013. "Promises and Lies: An Experiment on Detecting Deception," Working Papers 1038, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Feb 2013.
  10. Shoji, Masahiro, 2013. "Guilt aversion and peer effects in crime: experimental and empirical evidence from Bangladesh," MPRA Paper 44746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Narita, Yusuke, 2014. "Guilt aversion revisited: An experimental test of a new model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 1-9.

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