A Model of Partnership Formation
AbstractThis paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and how to share the profit in a collaborative and competitive environment. We pro- vide necessary and su±cient conditions under which an equilibrium can be attained. In equilibrium, the partner formation and the payoff distribution are endogenously determined. Every agent realizes his full potential and has no incentive to deviate from either staying independent or from the endogenously determined partner and payoff. The partnership formation problem contains the classical assignment market problem as a special case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-103.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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Partnership formation; equilibrium; indivisibility; assignment market;
Other versions of this item:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-01-31 (Business Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-31 (Game Theory)
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