Cooperation in Dividing the Cake
AbstractThis paper defines models of cooperation among players partition- ing a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooper- ating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the di- vision.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-101.
Date of creation: 2008
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fair division; cooperative games; maximin partition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-31 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2009-01-31 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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