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Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning: The Minority Game

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Author Info
Kets, W.
Voorneveld, M. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

The minority game is a simple congestion game in which the players? main goal is to choose among two options the one that is adopted by the smallest number of players. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of several well-known learning processes in the minority game with an arbitrary odd number of players. Interestingly, different learning processes provide considerably different predictions.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2007-61.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200761

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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