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Egalitarianism in Multi-Choice Games

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  • Brânzei, R.
  • Llorca, N.
  • Sánchez-Soriano, J.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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    Abstract

    In this paper we introduce the equal division core for arbitrary multi-choice games and the constrained egalitarian solution for con- vex multi-choice games, using a multi-choice version of the Dutta-Ray algorithm for traditional convex games. These egalitarian solutions for multi-choice games have similar properties as their counterparts for traditional cooperative games. On the class of convex multi-choice games, we axiomatically characterize the constrained egalitarian solu- tion.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2007-55.

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    Date of creation: 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200755

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    Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

    Related research

    Keywords: Multi-choice games; Convex games; Equal division core; Constrained egalitarian solution;

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    References

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    1. Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
    2. Fields, Gary S & Fei, John C H, 1978. "On Inequality Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 303-16, March.
    3. Hsiao, Chih-Ru & Raghavan, T E S, 1992. "Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 301-12.
    4. Nouweland, C.G.A.M.. van den & Potters, J. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J., 1991. "Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games," Research Memorandum 478, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    5. Dasgupta, Partha & Sen, Amartya & Starrett, David, 1973. "Notes on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 180-187, April.
    6. Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J., 2007. "Convex Multi-Choice Cooperative Games and their Monotonic Allocation Schemes," Discussion Paper 2007-54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
    8. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
    9. Toru Hokari, 2000. "Population monotonic solutions on convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 327-338.
    10. Klijn, Flip & Slikker, Marco & Tijs, Stef & Zarzuelo, Jose, 2000. "The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 111-121, July.
    11. Dutta, B, 1990. "The Egalitarian Solution and Reduced Game Properties in Convex Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 153-69.
    12. Anindya Bhattacharya, 2004. "On the equal division core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 391-399, 04.
    13. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    14. Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen & Bezalel Peleg, 2001. "On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 147-165.
    15. Manishi Prasad & Peter Wahlqvist & Rich Shikiar & Ya-Chen Tina Shih, 2004. "A," PharmacoEconomics, Springer Healthcare | Adis, vol. 22(4), pages 225-244.
    16. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "The Equal Split-Off Set for Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper 2004-110, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    17. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1991. "Constrained egalitarian allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 403-422, November.
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