This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for characterizing the Alexia value.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
2007-52.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Reijnierse, Hans & Maschler, Michael & Potters, Jos & Tijs, Stef, 1996.
"Simple Flow Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 238-260, October.
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