Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance in a Lifetime Perspective
AbstractAdvances in information technology have improved the administrative feasibility of redis- tribution based on lifetime earnings recorded at the time of retirement. We study optimal lifetime income taxation and social insurance in an economy in which redistributive taxation and social insurance serve to insure (ex ante) against skill heterogeneity as well as disability risk. Optimal disability benefits rise with previous earnings so that public transfers depend not only on current earnings but also on earnings in the past. Hence, lifetime taxation rather than annual taxation is optimal. The optimal tax-transfer system does not provide full disability insurance. By offering imperfect insurance and structuring disability benefits so as to enable workers to insure against disability by working harder, social insurance is designed to offset the distortionary impact of the redistributive labor income tax on labor supply.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2007-14.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Optimal lifetime income taxation; optimal social insurance;
Other versions of this item:
- A. Lans Bovenberg & Peter Birch Sørensen, . "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance in a Lifetime Perspective," EPRU Working Paper Series 06-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Lans Bovenberg & Peter Birch Sørensen, 2006. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance ina Lifetime Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 1690, CESifo Group Munich.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2007-03-17 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-03-17 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2007-03-17 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-64, May.
- Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2002.
"Integration of Unemployment Insurance with Retirement Insurance,"
NBER Working Papers
9199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Yun, Jungyoll, 2005. "Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2037-2067, December.
- Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2002. "Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance," Discussion Papers 0203-04, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Fölster, Stefan & Gidehag, Robert & Orszag, Mike & Snower, Dennis J., 2002.
"Assessing Welfare Accounts,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3479, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
- A. Lans Bovenberg & Peter Birch Sørensen, 2004.
"Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 507-529, 08.
- A. Lans Bovenberg & Peter Birch Sørensen, . "Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-07, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Aug 2003.
- Lans Bovenberg & Peter Birch Sørensen, 2003. "Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 1041, CESifo Group Munich.
- Martin Feldstein & Daniel Altman, 2007.
"Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts,"
in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 21, pages 35-64
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Folster, Stefan, 1999. "Social Insurance Based on Personal Savings," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 75(228), pages 5-18, March.
- Dixit, Avinash K & Sandmo, Angar, 1977. " Some Simplified Formulae for Optimal Income Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(4), pages 417-23.
- Orszag, Mike & Snower, Dennis J., 1997. "Expanding the Welfare System: A Proposal for Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 1674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- William Vickrey, 1939. "Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47, pages 379.
- Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978.
"A model of social insurance with variable retirement,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
- P. A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1977. "A Model of Social Insurance With Variable Retirement," Working papers 210, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.