This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A non-cooperative approach to the compensation rules for primeval games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ju, Yuan
Borm, Peter (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. In this paper, we provide a non-cooperative approach to address these problems more specifically. Inspired by the generalized bidding approach (Ju and Wettstein (2006)) for TU games, we design various bidding mechanisms to fit the model of primeval games and show that each implements the corresponding compensation rule in subgame perfect equilibrium. These mechanisms require nearly no condition on the game environment and obtain each solution itself rather than in expected terms. Moreover, since the various mechanisms share a common basic structure, this paper offers a non-cooperative benchmark to compare different axiomatic solutions, which, in return, may advance the axiomatic study of the issue by constructing alternative compensation rules.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=53974
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 97.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200697

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).

Related research
Keywords: 91A06 91A10 91A12

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm, 2005. "Externalities and Compensation:Primeval Games and Solutions," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2005/05, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2004. "Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 611.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  3. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The consensus value : a new solution concept for cooperative games," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Bolger, E M, 1989. "A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 37-44.
  7. Ju, Y., 2004. "The consensus value for games in partition function form," Discussion Paper 60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hal R. Varian, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed}," Microeconomics 9401003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H., 2002. "The Shapley value for partition function form games," Discussion Paper 4, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 900 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.