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On the core of routing games with revenues

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Author Info
Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza
Borm, Peter
Meertens, Marc
Reijnierse, Hans (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

Traveling salesman problems with revenues form a generalization of traveling salesman problems. Here, next to travel costs an explicit revenue is generated by visiting a city. We analyze routing problems with revenues, where a predetermined route on all cities determines the tours along subgroups. Corresponding routing games with revenues are analyzed. It is shown that these games have a nonempty core and a complete description of the core is provided.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 43.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200643

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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  1. Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2006. "On the core of multiple longest traveling salesman games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(3), pages 1816-1827, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Jean Derks & Jeroen Kuipers, 1997. "On the Core of Routing Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 193-205.
  3. Branzei, R. & Inarra, E. & Tijs, S. & Zarzuelo, J.M., 2003. "An algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit problems," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rodica Brânzei & Elena Iñarra & Stef Tijs & José Zarzuelo, 2006. "A Simple Algorithm for the Nucleolus of Airport Profit Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 259-272, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Suijs, J. & Borm, P. & Hamers, H. & Koster, M. & Quant, M., 2001. "Communication and cooperation in public network situations," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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