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Two classes of cooperative games related to one-object auction situations

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Author Info
Branzei, Rodica
Fragnelli, Vito
Meca, Ana
Tijs, Stef (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers is known by all of them. Then two cooperative games, which we call the auction game and the ring game, corresponding to such a market situation are considered. Auction games are related to special total big boss games, while ring games are related to special convex games, the peer group games. It turns out that there exists a duality relation between the auction game and the ring game arising from the same two-corner market situation. For both classes of games relevant solution concepts are studied.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 25.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200625

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

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Related research
Keywords: 91A12; 90B05;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Papers 2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Tijs, Stef & Meca, Ana & Lopez, Marco A., 2005. "Benefit sharing in holding situations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(1), pages 251-269, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rodica Branzei & Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs, 2006. "Convex games versus clan games," Working Papers 381, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
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