Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control
AbstractIn this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control.We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric.Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2006-114.
Date of creation: 2006
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Banzhaf value; hedonic game; semi-value; Shapley value; simple game; strict core;
Other versions of this item:
- Baris Ciftci & Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control," Working Papers 384, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2006-12-01 (Game Theory)
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