AbstractThis paper studies situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not executed as planned.It is divided into three parts.The first part analyzes the case where the activities may be delayed; this possibly induces a delay on the project as a whole with additional costs.Associated delayed project games are defined and are shown to have a nonempty core.The second part considers the case where the activities may be expedited; this possibly induces an expedition of the project as a whole creating profits. Corresponding expedited project games are introduced and are shown to be convex. The third and last part studies situations where some activities may be delayed and some activities may be expedited.Related project games are defined and shown to have a nonempty core.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2005-91.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2005-09-11 (Business Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-11 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brânzei, R. & Ferrari, G. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2002.
"Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91324, Tilburg University.
- BrÃ¢nzei, R. & Ferrari, G. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "Two Approaches to the Problem of Sharing Delay Costs in Joint Projects," Discussion Paper 2001-22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, 2012.
"A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 647-657.
- Estevez Fernandez, M.A., 2008. "A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects," Discussion Paper 2008-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Arantza Estévez-Fernández, 2009. "A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-090/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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