Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Assignment Situations with Multiple Ownership and their Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Miquel, S.
  • Velzen, S. van
  • Hamers, H.J.M.
  • Norde, H.W.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects.A non-negative reward matrix describes the profit if an object of one group is assigned to an object of the other group. Assuming that each object is owned by a different agent, Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced a class of assignment games arising from these assignment situations.This paper introduces assignment situations with multiple ownership. In these situations each object can be owned by several agents and each agent can participate in the ownership of more than one object.In this paper we study simple assignment games and relaxations that arise from assignment situations with multiple ownership.First, necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for balanced assignment situations with multiple ownership.An assignment situation with multiple ownership is balanced if for any choice of the reward matrix the corresponding simple assignment game is balanced.Second, balancedness results are obtained for relaxations of simple assignment games.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=53776
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Richard Broekman)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2005-78.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200578

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: assignment situations; matchings; assignment games; balancedness;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Solymosi, Tamas & Raghavan, Tirukkannamangai E S, 1994. "An Algorithm for Finding the Nucleolus of Asignment Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 119-43.
  2. T. E. S. Raghavan & Tamás Solymosi, 2001. "Assignment games with stable core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 177-185.
  3. Quint, Thomas, 1991. "Characterization of Cores of Assignment Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 413-20.
  4. Nunez, Marina & Rafels, Carles, 2003. "Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 311-331, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200578. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.