This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Law and behaviours in social dilemmas: testing the effect of obligations on cooperation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Galbiati, Roberto
Vertova, Pietro (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Laws consist of two components: the 'obligations' they express and the 'incentives' designed to enforce them. In this paper we run a public good experiment to test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. The results show that, for given marginal incentives, different levels of minimum contribution required by obligation determine significantly different levels of average contributions. Moreover, unexpected changes in the minimum contribution set up by obligation have asymmetric dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the descending trend of cooperation, whereas an increase induces a temporary re-start in the average level of cooperation. Nonetheless, obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=53754
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 56.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200556

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 585-608, June.
  2. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
  4. Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2004. "Norms in Law and Economics," Working Papers 2004-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert Cooter, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1051, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Robert Cooter, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
  8. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, . "Measuring Social Norms and Preferences using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists," IEW - Working Papers iewwp097, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, 2006. "The Hidden Effect of Rules: Behavioural consequences of Obligations," Discussion Papers 18_2006, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hörisch, Hannah & Strassmair, Christina, 2008. "An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis," Discussion Papers in Economics 2139, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.