Analysis of the Properties of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Law
AbstractThe main feature of the penalty schemes described in current sentencing guidelines is that the fine is based on the accumulated gains from cartel or price-fixing activities for the firm.These gains are usually difficult to estimate, but they can be approximated by a fraction of the turnover.The regulations thus suggest modeling the penalty as an increasing function of the accumulated illegal gains from price-fixing to the firm, so that the history of the violation is taken into account.We incorporate these features of the penalty scheme into an optimal control model of a profit-maximizing firm under antitrust enforcement.In order to determine the effect of taking into account "the history of the violation", we compare the outcome of this model with a model where the penalty is fixed.The main result of the analysis of the later model is that complete deterrence can be achieved only at the cost of shutting down the firm. The proportional scheme improves upon the fixed penalty since it can ensure complete deterrence in the long run, even when penalties are moderate. Phase-diagram analysis shows that the higher the probability and severity of punishment, the sooner cartel formation is blocked.Further, a sensitivity analysis is provided to show which strategies are most successful in reducing the degree of price-fixing.It turns out that, when the penalties are already high, the antitrust policy aiming at a further increase in the severity of punishment is less efficient than the policy that increases the probability of punishment.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-97.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
antitrust; law; policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2004-11-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2004-11-07 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-11-07 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Leung, S.F., 1991.
"How to Make the Fine Fit the Corporate Crime? An Analysis of Static and Dynamic Optimal Punishment Theories,"
RCER Working Papers
261, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Leung, Siu Fai, 1991. "How to make the fine fit the corporate crime? : An analysis of static and dynamic optimal punishment theories," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 243-256, July.
- Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2000.
"Optimal magnitude and probability of fines,"
Economics Working Papers
454, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Evgenia Motchenkova & Rob Laan, 2011. "Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 401-431, December.
- Leliefeld, Daniel & Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2007.
"To protect in order to serve, adverse effects of leniency programs in view of industry asymmetry,"
Serie Research Memoranda
0002, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- Leliefeld, D. & Motchenkova, E., 2007. "To Protect in Order to Serve: Adverse Effects of Leniency Programs in View of Industry Asymmetry," Discussion Paper 2007-007, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Motchenkova, E., 2004.
"Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability,"
2004-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.