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Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game

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Author Info

  • Sun, N.
  • Trockel, W.
  • Yang, Z.F.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-93.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200493

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: game theory; cooperative games; general equilibrium;

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References

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  19. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 335-44.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bejan, Camelia & Gómez, Juan Camilo, 2012. "A market interpretation of the proportional extended core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 636-638.
  2. Myrna Wooders, 2009. "Market Games and Clubs," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0919, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  3. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.
  4. Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch, 2013. "Multicoalitional solutions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00881108, HAL.
  5. Tomoki Inoue, 2010. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Working Papers 430, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  6. Camelia Bejan & Juan Gómez, 2012. "Axiomatizing core extensions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 885-898, November.
  7. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games," Working Papers 454, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  8. Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
  9. Inoue, Tomoki, 2012. "Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 143-147.
  10. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs," Working Papers 453, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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