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Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games

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Author Info
Dimitrov, D.
Borm, P.E.M.
Hendrickx, R.L.P.
Sung, S.C. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some su.cient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 5.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:20045

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics

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  1. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ballester, Coralio, 2004. "NP-completeness in hedonic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Antonio Romero-Medina & Katari´na Cechlárová, 2001. "Stability in coalition formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 487-494. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2003. "Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/35, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2008. "Dichotomous Preferences and Power Set Extensions," Discussion Papers in Economics 6431, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao-Chin Sung, 2008. "Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2008.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Shao Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2007. "On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 31-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dimitrov, D. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Enemies and friends in hedonic games : individual deviations, stability and manipulation," Discussion Paper 111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2006. "A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Vincent Iehlé, 2005. "The core-partition of hedonic games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05091, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
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  9. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2009. "Strategy-proof coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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