This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Relationships as commitment devices : strategic silence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nir, A. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract

People who understand self-control problems can devise mechanisms to overcome them. In this paper, we discuss how relationships can help individuals overcome their selfcontrol problems by creating a tradeoff between desired present procrastination and undesired future procrastination. Threatening not to speak to a person who caves in can create such a tradeoff. The results depend on a limited memory assumption. We show how such interactions can explain strategic pretence, strategic ignorance, why a person would choose to punish himself after he caved in and why punishments need to increase if not adhered to immediately.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=10556
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 49.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200449

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General
R20 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Household Analysis - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Self-Confidence And Personal Motivation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 871-915, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Akerlof, George A, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
  3. repec:fth:harver:1440 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Thaler, Richard, 1981. "Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 201-207. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Carrillo, Juan D & Mariotti, Thomas, 2000. "Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 529-44, July.
  7. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
  8. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 198, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  9. Ted O' Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Choice and Procrastination," Microeconomics 0012002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Benabou, R. & Battaglini, M., 2001. "Self-Control in peer Groups," Papers 217, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    Other versions:
  11. Laibson, David, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-77, May.
  12. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Doing It Now or Later," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 103-124, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Benabou, R. & Tirole, J., 2001. "Willpower and Personal Rules," Papers 216, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    Other versions:
  14. Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Choice And Procrastination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 121-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 77% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.