Relationships as Commitment Devices: Strategic Silence
AbstractPeople who understand self-control problems can devise mechanisms to overcome them.In this paper, we discuss how relationships can help individuals overcome their selfcontrol problems by creating a tradeoff between desired present procrastination and undesired future procrastination.Threatening not to speak to a person who caves in can create such a tradeoff.The results depend on a limited memory assumption.We show how such interactions can explain strategic pretence, strategic ignorance, why a person would choose to punish himself after he caved in and why punishments need to increase if not adhered to immediately.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-49.
Date of creation: 2004
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strategy; bias; behavioural science;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
- R20 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2004-06-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GEO-2004-06-13 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-HPE-2004-06-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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