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Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy

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Author Info
Quant, M.
Borm, P.E.M.
Hendrickx, R.L.P.
Zwikker, P. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new family of compromise solutions for the class of compromise admissible games. These solutions extend bankruptcy rules. In particular, we show that the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule coincides with the barycentre of the core cover and characterise this rule by consistency. We also provide a characterisation of the TAL-family of rules.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 33.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200433

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
  2. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Velzen, S. van, 2003. "Compromise stable TU-games," Discussion Paper 55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Lohmann, E. & Borm, P.E.M. & Quant, M., 2007. "A Stroll with Alexia," Discussion Paper 2007-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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