Diaw, K.M. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract
This paper analyzes tax/subsidy competition and transfer pricing regulation between governments involved in trade through a multinational firm and a joint venture using an input provided by the former. The paper takes into account the fact that in absence of bargaining, any model of such JV is discontinuous in the ownership distribution in that for di erent ownership distributions, control is either fully held by one party, or no party in particular. The paper therefore model control problems that are inherent to JVs without strongly dominant shareholder and provides along the way a rationale for indigenization policies that restrict foreign ownership.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
3.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
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