Sequencing Games with Repeated Players
AbstractTwo classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations.In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player's cost function is linear with respect to the maximum completion time of his jobs, whereas in min-RP sequencing situations the cost functions are linear with respect to the minimum completion times.For both classes, following explicit procedures to go from the initial processing order to an optimal order for the coalition of all players, equal gain splitting rules are defined.It is shown that these rules lead to core elements of the associated RP sequencing games.Moreover, it is seen that min-RP sequencing games are convex.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-128.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
cooperative game theory; sequencing; equal gain splitting; core; convexity;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Calleja, P. & Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2004. "Job Scheduling, Cooperation and Control," Discussion Paper 2004-65, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Curiel, I. & Pederzoli, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1989. "Sequencing games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154243, Tilburg University.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
- Curiel, Imma & Pederzoli, Giorgio & Tijs, Stef, 1989. "Sequencing games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 344-351, June.
- Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Mosquera, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2006. "Proportionate Flow Shop Games," Discussion Paper 2006-63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker, 2013. "Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate," Working Papers 709, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Quant, M. & Meertens, M. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2008.
"Processing games with shared interest,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-196215, Tilburg University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.