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Shareholder Lockup Agreements in the European New Markets

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Author Info
Goergen, M.
Renneboog, L.D.R.
Khurshed, A. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

We analyse the characteristics of lockup agreements of IPOs on the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marche from 1996 to 2000.Even though both markets were part of the same EuroNM network, the characteristics of their lockup agreements are substantially different.Firm characteristics have a major influence on lockup contracts.In addition, shareholder characteristics explain the diversity of contracts within the same firm.Although the French regulator offers two types of minimum lockup contracts, the market perceives a difference between the two contracts as the choice is influenced by the type of the firm and the type of shareholders.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-121.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004121

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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  1. Megginson, William L & Weiss, Kathleen A, 1991. " Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 879-903, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laura Casares Field, 2001. "The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 471-500, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, 2002. "Why Don't Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs?," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(2), pages 413-444, March.
  4. Michaely, Roni & Shaw, Wayne H, 1994. "The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 279-319. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Goergen, M. & Khurshed, A. & McCahery, J.A. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2002. "The Rise and Fall of the European New Markets: On the Short and Long-Run Performance of High-Tech Initial Public Offerings," Discussion Paper 2002-101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Lin, Timothy H. & Smith, Richard L., 1998. "Insider reputation and selling decisions: the unwinding of venture capital investments during equity IPOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 241-263, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, 2003. "The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 1-29.
  9. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1998. "Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(1), pages 177-, March.
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  10. Carter, Richard B & Manaster, Steven, 1990. " Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1045-67, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Espenlaub, S. & Goergen, M. & Khurshed, A. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2002. "Lock-In Agreements in Venture Capital Backed UK IPOs," Discussion Paper 2002-46, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Baker, Malcolm & Gompers, Paul A, 2003. "The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 569-98, October.
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