Shareholder Lockup Agreements in the European New Markets
AbstractWe analyse the characteristics of lockup agreements of IPOs on the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marche from 1996 to 2000.Even though both markets were part of the same EuroNM network, the characteristics of their lockup agreements are substantially different.Firm characteristics have a major influence on lockup contracts.In addition, shareholder characteristics explain the diversity of contracts within the same firm.Although the French regulator offers two types of minimum lockup contracts, the market perceives a difference between the two contracts as the choice is influenced by the type of the firm and the type of shareholders.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-121.
Date of creation: 2004
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Initial public offerings; IPO; lockup agreements; lockup agreements; underpricing; Neuer Markt; Nouveau Marché; EuroNM; asymmetric information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2005-01-02 (European Economics)
- NEP-EEC-2005-01-05 (European Economics)
- NEP-FMK-2005-01-02 (Financial Markets)
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