Symmetric convex games and stable structures

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Symmetric convex games and stable structures

Author Info

Slikker, M.
Norde, H.W. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Marco Slikker

Abstract

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We answer an open question in the literature by showing that in a specific symmetric convex game with six players a structure that results in the same payoffs as the full cooperation structure can be formed according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 114.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004114

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2005-01-02 (Game Theory)

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Game Theory and Information 0303010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Grand Coalition 15, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers 1160, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers 2003.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dutta, B. & Nouweland, A. van den & Tijs, S., 1995. "Link Formation in Cooperative Situations," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Slikker, Marco & Norde, Henk, 2004. "Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 171-200, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Slikker, M. & Norde, H., 2000. "Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games," Discussion Paper 97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2001. "Strongly Stable Networks," Grand Coalition 7, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Microeconomics 0211006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2001. "Strongly Stable Networks," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-3, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 15 Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Working Papers 1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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