Enemies and friends in hedonic games : individual deviations, stability and manipulation

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Enemies and friends in hedonic games : individual deviations, stability and manipulation

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Dimitrov, D.
Sung, S.C. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Dinko Dimitrov

Abstract

We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations are allowed. For two natural subdomains of separable preferences, namely preference domains based on (1) aversion to enemies and (2) appreciation of friends, we show that an individually stable coalition structure always exist, and a Nash stable coalition structure exists when mutuality is imposed. Moreover, we show that on the domain of separable preferences a contractual individually stable coalition structure can be obtained in polynomial time. Finally, we prove that, on each of the two subdomains, the corresponding algorithm that we use for finding Nash stable and individually stable coalition structures turns out to be strategy-proof.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 111.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004111

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-12-02 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm, 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 135, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Chin Sung, 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2004.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
- Dimitrov, D. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Sung, 2006. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 421-433, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ballester, Coralio, 2004. "NP-completeness in hedonic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]

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