Enemies and Friends in Hedonic Games: Individual Deviations, Stability and Manipulation
AbstractWe consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations are allowed.For two natural subdomains of separable preferences, namely preference domains based on (1) aversion to enemies and (2) appreciation of friends, we show that an individually stable coalition structure always exist, and a Nash stable coalition structure exists when mutuality is imposed.Moreover, we show that on the domain of separable preferences a contractual individually stable coalition structure can be obtained in polynomial time.Finally, we prove that, on each of the two subdomains, the corresponding algorithm that we use for finding Nash stable and individually stable coalition structures turns out to be strategy-proof.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-111.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
additive separability; coalition formation; hedonic games; stability; strategy-proofness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-02 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Chin Sung, 2004.
"Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games,"
2004.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Sung, 2006. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 421-433, April.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm, 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 135, Econometric Society.
- Dimitrov, D.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Discussion Paper 2004-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dimitrov, D.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Sung, S.C., 2006. "Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-194178, Tilburg University.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001.
"Core in a simple coalition formation game,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
- Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February.
- Ballester, Coralio, 2004. "NP-completeness in hedonic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-30, October.
- Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
- Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.