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The equal split-off set for cooperative games

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Author Info
Branzei, R.
Dimitrov, D.
Tijs, S.H. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

In this paper the equal split-o. set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-o. set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 110.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004110

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen & Bezalel Peleg, 2001. "On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 147-165. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1991. "Constrained egalitarian allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 403-422, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Branzei, Rodica & Dimitrov, Dinko & Tijs, Stef, 2006. "Convex games versus clan games," Discussion Paper 58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Branzei, R. & Llorca, N. & Sanchez-Soriano, J. & Tijs, S.H., 2007. "Egalitarianism in Multi-Choice Games," Discussion Paper 2007-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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