Core Stability in Chain-Component Additive Games
AbstractChain-component additive games are graph-restricted superadditive games, where an exogenously given line-graph determines the cooperative possibilities of the players.These games can model various multi-agent decision situations, such as strictly hierarchical organisations or sequencing / scheduling related problems, where an order of the agents is fixed by some external factor, and with respect to this order only consecutive coalitions can generate added value. In this paper we characterise core stability of chain-component additive games in terms of polynomial many linear inequalities and equalities that arise from the combinatorial structure of the game.Furthermore we show that core stability is equivalent to essential extendibility.We also obtain that largeness of the core as well as extendibility and exactness of the game are equivalent properties which are all sufficient for core stability.Moreover, we also characterise these properties in terms of linear inequalities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-101.
Date of creation: 2004
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Core stability; graph-restricted games; large core; exact game;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-02 (All new papers)
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