Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
AbstractWe consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (Osborne ) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the subgame-perfect equilibria in a three-candidate game. Our results show that allowing for endogenous timing can eliminate some of the more unappealing equilibrium characteristics of the standard model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2004-10.
Date of creation: 2004
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
voting; political economy; games; general equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Steffen Huck & Vicki Knoblauch & Wieland MÃ¼ller, 2006. "Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 557-570, December.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-02-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GEO-2004-02-08 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-POL-2004-02-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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- L. Lambertini, 2007.
"Platform Stickiness in a Spatial Voting Model,"
597, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:40:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
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