Competitive Procurement and Asset Specificity
AbstractThis paper studies the effects of asset specificity on the performance of procurement auctions with subcontracting and asset sales.The analysis highlights the role of several asset features like transfer costs, type of alternative uses and maintenance requirements.It is argued that, if bargaining over subcontracting or asset sales is efficient enough, then the presence of durable specific assets per se does not have decisive effects on the competitive pressure from potential entrants.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2003-96.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
competitiveness; transaction costs; franchising; monopoly; regulations; auctions; markov processes; general equilibrium; asset specificity;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-12-07 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2002.
"Optimal Auction with Resale,"
Staff General Research Papers
12664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.