Fixed Tree Games with Repeated Players
AbstractThis paper introduces fixed tree games with repeated players (FRP games) which are a generalization of standard fixed tree games.This generalization consists in allowing players to be located in more than one vertex.As a consequence, these players can choose among several ways of connection with the root.In this paper we show that FRP games are balanced.Moreover, we prove that the core of an FRP game coincides with the core of a related concave fixed tree game.We show how to find the nucleolus and we characterize the orders which provide marginal vectors in the core of an FRP game.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2003-87.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
games; cooperative games; core;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-12-07 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Koster, M.A.L. & Molina, E. & Sprumont, Y. & Tijs, S.H., 2001.
"Sharing the cost of a network: Core and core allocations,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91407, Tilburg University.
- S. H. Tijs & M. Koster & E. Molina & Y. Sprumont, 2002. "Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 567-599.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00308738 is not listed on IDEAS
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.