Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweitzer's Open Club Model Semi-Public Goods
AbstractLimit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy.An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer s concept of club e ciency under a variable number of economic agents.We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature.We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club e cient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods.We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2003-56.
Date of creation: 2003
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general equilibrium; public goods; efficiency; allocation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Hans Wiesmeth & Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber, 1995.
"Core equivalence with congested public goods,"
Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 373-387.
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