Raa, M.H. ten Gilles, R.P. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract
Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer s concept of club e ciency under a variable number of economic agents. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club e cient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
56.
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