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Compromise stable TU-games

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Author Info
Quant, M.
Borm, P.E.M.
Reijnierse, J.H.
Velzen, S. van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games). Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems. Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized. The relation between core cover andWeber set is studied and it is proved that under a weak condition their intersection is nonempty.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 55.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200355

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C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Potters, Jos & Poos, Rene & Tijs, Stef & Muto, Shigeo, 1989. "Clan games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Zwikker, P., 2004. "Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy," Discussion Paper 33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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