Following extensive empirical evidence about market anomalies and overconfidence, the analysis of financial markets with agents overconfident about the precision of their private information has received a lot of attention. However, all these models consider agents trading for their own account. In this article, we analyse a standard delegated portfolio management problem between a financial institution and a money manager who may be of two types: rational or overconfident. We consider several situations. In each case, we derive the optimal contract and results on the performance of financial institution hiring overconfident managers relative to institutions hiring rational agents, and results on the price impact of overconfidence.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
54.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990.
"Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: