This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2003-05-15 (All new papers)

1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
2. Jan Potters & Casper G. de Vries & Frans van Winden, 1998. "An Experimental Examination of Rational Rent-Seeking," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-068/1, Tinbergen Institute.
   Other versions:
   • Potters, Jan & de Vries, Casper G. & van Winden, Frans, 1998. "An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 783-800, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998. " Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998. "Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. " Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Ghazala Azmat & Nagore Iriberri, 2009. "The Importance of Relative Performance Feedback Information: Evidence from a Natural Experiment using High School Students," CEP Discussion Papers dp0915, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
2. Christine Harbring & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Kräkel & Reinhard Selten, 2004. "Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse12_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
3. Oliver Kirchkamp,, 2006. "Less fighting than expected — experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0607, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2008. "Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions," Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics 2008-023, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
4. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2004. "Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 1340, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
5. PARREIRAS, SŽrgio O. & RUBINCHIK-PESSACH, Anna, 2006. "Contests with heterogeneous agents," CORE Discussion Papers 2006004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
6. Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00276396_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3440, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
7. Richard B. Freeman, 2006. "Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament," NBER Working Papers 12588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Bernd Irlenbusch & Gabriele K. Ruchala, 2006. "Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation," IZA Discussion Papers 2423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
9. Ghazala Azmat & Nagore Iriberri, 2009. "The Importance of Relative Performance Feedback Information: Evidence from a Natural Experiment using High School Students," Economics Working Papers 1148, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
10. Christine Harbring & Bernd Irlenbusch, 2005. "How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage," IZA Discussion Papers 1777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
11. Freeman, Richard B. & Gelber, Alexander M., 2008. "Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 12156, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]