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How to organize sequential auctions results of a natural experiment by Christie's

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Author Info
Ours, J.C. van
Ginsburgh, V. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

In empirical studies of sequential auctions of identical objects prices have been found to decline. We study auctions of ancient Chinese porcelain recovered from shipwrecks. In these auctions there are very long sequences of lots of identical objects. We find that the average price decline is smaller in long sequences. It is especially large for the first pair of lots auctioned; it is also larger when the price of the previous lot was larger than (the upper bound of the range of) the pre-sale estimate of the previous lot and when the number of items in lots that follow each other increases. As a consequence, it appears that sellers may have some control over the sequence of prices and therefore on their revenue. Our results point to the fact that a sequence of lots each of which contains the same number of items generates more revenue than lots with varying number of items.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 25.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200325

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D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ashenfelter, Orley & Genesove, David, 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 501-05, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Black, Jane & De Meza, David, 1992. "Systematic Price Differences between Successive Auctions Are No Anomaly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(4), pages 607-28, Winter.
  3. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1994. "A Note on Sequential Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 653-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Beggs, A. & Graddy, K., 1996. "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers 99184, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Campos, Nauro F. & Leite Barbosa, Renata, 2008. "Paintings and Numbers: An Econometric Investigation of Sales Rates, Prices and Returns in Latin American Art Auctions," IZA Discussion Papers 3445, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison, 2006. "Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1422, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2008. "Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 857, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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