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On the Core of Multiple Longest Traveling Salesman Games

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  • Estevez Fernandez, M.A.
  • Borm, P.E.M.
  • Hamers, H.J.M.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) games. An MLTS game arises from a network in which a salesman has to visit each node (player) precisely once, except its home location, in an order that maximizes the total reward.First it is shown that the value of a coalition of an MLTS game is determined by taking the maximum of suitable combinations of one and two person coalitions.Secondly it is shown that MLTS games with ¯ve or less players have a nonempty core.However, a six player MLTS game may have an empty core.For the special instance where the reward between a pair of nodes is equal to 0 or 1, we provide relations between the structure of the core and the underlying network.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2003-127.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2003127

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: game theory; traveling salesman problem; games; core;

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  1. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00625339 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Meertens, M. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2006. "On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues," Discussion Paper 2006-43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Grabisch, Michel & Li, Tong, 2011. "On the set of imputations induced by the k-additive core," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 214(3), pages 697-702, November.

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