Velzen, S. van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract
In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from sequencing situations in which the processing times are not fixed. We show that these games are balanced by obtaining two core elements that depend only on the optimal schedule for the grand coalition. Furthermore we show that, although these games are not convex in general, many marginal vectors are core elements. We also consider convexity for special instances of the sequencing situation.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
105.
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