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The Constrained Equal Award Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions

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  • Casas-Mendez, B.
  • Borm, P.E.M.
  • Carpente, L.
  • Hendrickx, R.L.P.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

In this paper, we provide four extensions of the constrained equal award rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of bankruptcy situations with a priori unions. We present some characterisations and relations with corresponding games. The four new extensions are illustrated by a specific application.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2002-83.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200283

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: bankruptcy; a priori unions; constrained equal award;

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References

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  1. Calleja, P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2001. "Multi-Issue Allocation Games," Discussion Paper 2001-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
  3. Hamiache, Gerard, 1999. "A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 281-305, May.
  4. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2002. "Sustainability in bankruptcy problems," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 261-273, December.
  5. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Lorenzo-Freire, S. & Casas-Mendez, B. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2005. "The Two-stage Constrained Equal Awards and Losses Rules for Multi-Issue Allocation Situation," Discussion Paper 2005-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  3. Gonzalez-Alcon, C. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2007. "A composite run-to-the-bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-194181, Tilburg University.

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