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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2002-6.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:20026

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2002-03-14 (All new papers)
• NEP-IAS-2002-03-14 (Insurance Economics)

References

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1. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis," Experimental 9707001, EconWPA.
   
   • Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
   • Clark, K. & Kay, S. & Sefton, M, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self Enforcing ? An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 97-04, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
2. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July.
   
   • BERGIN, James & LIPMAN, Bart, 1994. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," CORE Discussion Papers 1994055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
   • J Bergin & B L Lipman, 1997. "Evolution with state-dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 771, David K. Levine.
3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
4. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May.
5. Andreas Blume, 1993. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Game Theory and Information 9312002, EconWPA.
   
   • Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
   • Andreas Blume, 1996. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Game Theory and Information 9604001, EconWPA.
   • Blume, A., 1996. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Working Papers 96-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
6. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
   
   • Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
7. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-64, May.
8. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
   
   • K. Warneryd, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 543, David K. Levine.
9. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
10. Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," Discussion Paper Serie B 299, University of Bonn, Germany.
    
    • Karl H. Schlag, . "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," ELSE working papers 026, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
11. Arthur J Robson & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2112, David K. Levine.
    
    • Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July.
12. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
13. Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September.
    
    • Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
14. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine.
15. Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
16. Rankin, Frederick W. & Van Huyck, John B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 2000. "Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 315-337, August.
17. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
    
    • Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    • Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
18. Schlag,Karl, . "Cheap talk and evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Serie B 242, University of Bonn, Germany.
    
    • K. Schlag, 2010. "Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 541, David K. Levine.
19. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
20. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
21. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.

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Cited by:

1. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Cheap Talk and Spiteful Preferences in Ultimatum Games: Experiments and Evolutionary Rationale," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-89223, Tilburg University.

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