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Efficiency versus Risk Dominance in an Evolutionary Model with Cheap Talk

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  • Vyrastekova, J.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2002-6.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:20026

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: Cheap talk; evolutionary game theory; coordination games; risk dominance;

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References

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  1. J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
  2. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May.
  3. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July.
  5. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
  6. K. Schlag, 2010. "Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 541, David K. Levine.
  7. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  8. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  9. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  10. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-64, May.
  11. Rankin, Frederick W. & Van Huyck, John B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 2000. "Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 315-337, August.
  12. Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  13. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
  14. COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  15. Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," Discussion Paper Serie B 299, University of Bonn, Germany.
  16. Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
  17. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine.
  18. K. Warneryd, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 543, David K. Levine.
  19. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  20. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  21. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
  22. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Cheap Talk and Spiteful Preferences in Ultimatum Games: Experiments and Evolutionary Rationale," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-89223, Tilburg University.

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