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When do German firms change their dividends?

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Author Info
Correia da Silva, L.
Goergen, M.
Renneboog, L.D.R. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the dividend policy of German firms is more flexible than the one of their Anglo-American counterparts. This paper analyses the decision to change the dividend for a panel of 221 German firms from 1984 to 1994. The choice of the period of study is motivated by the fact that at the start of this period there was an economic boom which was followed by a recession. Consistent with the traditional dividend literature, e.g. Lintner (1956), net earnings are key determinants of the decision to change the dividend. However, the study comes up with two findings which are contrary to Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961). First, the level of net earnings is not the only key determinant of the dividend decision, as the occurrence of a loss - whatever its magnitude - has an explanatory power exceeding the one of the level of the loss. Second, dividend cuts or omissions tend to be temporary and the majority of German firms quickly (within two years) revert to their initial dividend level. This stands in marked contrast with DeAngelo et al. (1992) who find that US firms are more likely to reduce their dividend when earnings deteriorate on a permanent basis. Furthermore, the fact that German firms frequently omit and cut their dividend and quickly return to their initial dividend suggests that dividends in Germany have less of a signalling role than dividends in the US and the UK. Our findings also contradict Bhattacharya's (1979) argument that the costs of dividend changes are asymmetric with dividend reductions being more costly to the firm than dividend increases. Finally, we find evidence that firms with banks as their major shareholder are more willing to omit their dividend than firms controlled by other types of shareholder.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 56.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200256

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mayer, Colin & Alexander, Ian, 1990. "Banks and securities markets: Corporate financing in Germany and the United Kingdom," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 450-475, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, 2003. "Why Are the Levels of Control (So) Different in German and U.K. Companies? Evidence from Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 141-175, April.
  3. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 1988. "Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 149-175, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Pettit, R Richardson, 1972. "Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, and Capital Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 27(5), pages 993-1007, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Amihud, Yakov & Murgia, Maurizio, 1997. " Dividends, Taxes, and Signaling: Evidence from Germany," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 397-408, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda & Skinner, Douglas J., 1996. "Reversal of fortune Dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 341-371, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1984. "Convenient specification tests for logit and probit models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 241-262, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Ofer, Aharon R & Siegel, Daniel R, 1987. " Corporate Financial Policy, Information, and Market Expectations: An Empirical Investigation of Dividends," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(4), pages 889-911, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961. "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 411. [Downloadable!]
  11. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1990. " Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1415-31, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ofer, Aharon R & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. " A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative Corporate Cash Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(2), pages 365-94, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Sudipto Bhattacharya, 1979. "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 259-270, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda & Skinner, Douglas J, 1992. " Dividends and Losses," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(5), pages 1837-63, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Asquith, Paul & Mullins, David W, Jr, 1983. "The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payments on Shareholders' Wealth," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 77-96, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Kane, Alex & Lee, Young Ki & Marcus, Alan, 1984. " Earnings and Dividend Announcements: Is There a Corroboration Effect?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1091-99, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, Peter G., 2006. "How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder protection?," Discussion Paper 73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ming Dong & Chris Robinson & Chris Veld, 2004. "Why Individual Investors Want Dividends," Finance 0412009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, Grzegorz, 2005. "Control structures and payout policy," Discussion Paper 61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Zhang, C., 2008. "Do UK Institutional Shareholders Monitor their Investee Firms?," Discussion Paper 2008-38, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Christopher F Baum & Mustafa Caglayan & Oleksandr Talavera, 2009. "Corporate Liquidity Management and Future Investment Expenditures," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 712, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kleff, Volker & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Payout Policy and Owners? Interests ? Evidence from German Savings Banks," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-59, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, Grzegorz, 2005. "Patterns in payout policy and payout channel choice of UK firms in the 1990s," Discussion Paper 22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Andres, C. & Betzer, A. & Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2008. "The Dividend Policy of German Firms," Discussion Paper 2008-67, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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