Drop Out Monotonic Rules for Sequencing Situations
AbstractThis note introduces a new monotonicity property for sequencing situations. A sequencing rule is called drop out monotonic if no player will be worse off whenever one of the players decides to drop out of the queue before processing starts. This intuitively appealing property turns out to be very strong: we show that there is at most one rule satisfying both stability and drop out monotonicity. For the standard model of linear cost functions, the existence of this rule is established. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2002-51.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
queueing theory; game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Cristina Fernández & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Drop out monotonic rules for sequencing situations," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 501-504, 07.
- Borm, P.E.M. & Fernández, C. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Tijs, S.H., 2005. "Drop out monotonic rules for sequencing situations," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-171917, Tilburg University.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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