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On smiles, winks, and handshake as coordination devices

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Author Info
Manzini, P.
Sadrieh, A.
Vriend, N.J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 40.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200240

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Keywords: trust

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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  1. Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Gary Charness, 1998. "Pre-Play Communication and Credibility: A Test of Aumann's Conjecture," Economics Working Papers 293, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  15. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Scharlemann, Jorn P. W. & Eckel, Catherine C. & Kacelnik, Alex & Wilson, Rick K., 2001. "The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 617-640, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
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