This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2002-05-14 (All new papers)
• NEP-CDM-2002-05-14 (Collective Decision-Making)

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3. Arieh Gavious & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2002. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 709-722, Winter.
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13. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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14. Matejka, M. & Onderstal, S. & De Waegenaere, A., 2002. "The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
15. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information 9901004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    • Bulow, Jeremy I & Klemperer, Paul, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1142, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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16. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

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1. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and Its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 481-481, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Matejka, M. & Onderstal, S. & De Waegenaere, A., 2002. "The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]