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Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games

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Author Info
Branzei, R.
Dimitrov, D.
Tijs, S. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

For cooperative fuzzy games with a non-empty core hypercubes catching the core, the Weber set and the path solution cover are introduced. Using the bounding vectors of these hypercubes, compromise values are defined. Special attention is given to the relations between these values for convex fuzzy games.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 14.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200214

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Related research
Keywords: 90D12; 03E72;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Branzei, R. & Dimitrov, D. & Tijs, S., 2002. "Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes," Discussion Paper 13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bennett, Elaine & Wooders, Myrna, 1979. "Income distribution and firm formation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 304-317, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stef Tijs & Gert-Jan Otten, 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-36, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tsurumi, Masayo & Tanino, Tetsuzo & Inuiguchi, Masahiro, 2001. "A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 596-618, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Branzei, R. & Dimitrov, D. & Tijs, S., 2002. "Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games," Discussion Paper 97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Fukuda, E. & Tijs, S.H. & Branzei, R. & Muto, S., 2002. "Compromising in partition function form games and cooperation in perfect extensive form games," Discussion Paper 117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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