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Compromising in partition function form games and cooperation in perfect extensive form games

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Author Info
Fukuda, E.
Tijs, S.H.
Branzei, R.
Muto, S. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided. Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced. For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation. It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 117.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2002117

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  1. Branzei, R. & Dimitrov, D. & Tijs, S., 2002. "Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games," Discussion Paper 14, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bolger, E M, 1989. "A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 37-44.
  3. Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato, 1999. "The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 157-171. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fortin, Pierre & Keil, Manfred & Symons, James, 2001. "The Sources of Unemployment in Canada, 1967-91: Evidence from a Panel of Regions and Demographic Groups," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 67-93, January.
  5. Stef Tijs & Gert-Jan Otten, 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-36, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
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  7. Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H., 2002. "The Shapley value for partition function form games," Discussion Paper 4, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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