Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form
AbstractIn this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced.For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation.It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.
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Date of creation: 2002
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