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Communications and Cooperation in Public Network Situations


Author Info

  • Suijs, J.P.M.
  • Borm, P.E.M.
  • Hamers, H.J.M.
  • Koster, M.A.L.
  • Quant, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)


This paper focuses on sharing the costs and revenues of maintaining a public network communication structure.Revenues are assumed to be bilateral and communication links are publicly available but costly.It is assumed that agents are located at the vertices of an undirected graph in which the edges represent all possible communication links.We take the approach from cooperative game theory and focus on the corresponding network game in coalitional form which relates any coalition of agents to its highest possible net benefit, i.e., the net benefitt corresponding to an optimal operative network.Although finding an optimal network in general is a difficult problem, it is shown that corresponding network games are (totally) balanced.In the proof of this result a specific relaxation, duality and techniques of linear production games with committee control play a role.Sufficient conditions for convexity of network games are derived.Possible extensions of the model and its results are discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2001-44.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200144

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Keywords: cooperative games; communication; public sector;

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  1. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1981. "Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 283-286, October.
  2. Sharkey, W.W., 1991. "Network Models in Economics," Papers 69, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
  3. Curiel, I. & Derks, J. & Tijs, S.H., 1989. "On balanced games and games with committee control," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154242, Tilburg University.
  4. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
  1. Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Meertens, M. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2009. "On the core of routing games with revenues," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3573088, Tilburg University.
  2. Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Hans Reijnierse, 2012. "On the Core of Cost-Revenue Games: Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-101/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Michel Grabisch, 2010. "Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10093, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  4. Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Hans Reijnierse, 2012. "On the Core of Cost-Revenue Games: Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-101/II, Tinbergen Institute.


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