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Multi-Issue Allocation Games

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  • Calleja, P.
  • Borm, P.E.M.
  • Hendrickx, R.L.P.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper introduces a new class of transferable-utility games, called multi-issue allocation games.These games arise from various allocation situations and are based on the concepts underlying the bankruptcy model, as introduced by O'Neill (1982).In this model, a perfectly divisible good (estate) has to be divided amongst a given set of agents, each of whom has some claim on the estate.Contrary to the standard bankruptcy model, the current model deals with situations in which the agents' claims are multi-dimensional, where the dimensions correspond to various issues.It is shown that the class of multi-issue allocation games coincides with the class of (nonnegative) exact games.The run-to-the-bank rule is introduced as a solution for multi-issue allocation situations and turns out to be Shapley value of the corresponding game.Finally, this run-to-the-bank rule is characterised by means of a consistency property.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2001-30.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200130

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: game theory; allocation games;

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References

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  1. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
  2. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  3. Lerner, Anat, 1998. "A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 316-330, February.
  4. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
  5. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  6. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers & Ruud Hendrickx, 2001. "Operations research games: A survey," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 139-199, December.
  2. Casas-Mendez, B. & Borm, P.E.M. & Carpente, L. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2002. "The Constrained Equal Award Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions," Discussion Paper 2002-83, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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