Noise Trader Risk and the Political Economy of Privatization
AbstractThe 'noise trader' model of De Long et al. provides a plausible account of the determination of the equity premium.Extension of the model to allow for privatization of publicly-owned assets yields insights into the positive political economy of privatization and into the normative question of how policies should be evaluated in the presence of mistaken beliefs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2001-104.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
risk; privatization; political economy; noise trader;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-01-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2002-01-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2002-01-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2002-01-22 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics
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3725552, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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"The equity premium: a puzzle,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1401, David K. Levine.
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377R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- John Quiggin, 1995. "Does Privatisation Pay?," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 28(2), pages 23-42.
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- Grant, S. & Quiggin, J., 2001. "The Risk Premium for Equity: Explanations and Implications," Discussion Paper 2001-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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