A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme

Author Info

Norde, H.
Reijnierse, H. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Hans Reijnierse

Abstract

A vector of balanced weights infers an inequality that games with a nonempty core obey. This paper gives a generalization of the notion `vector of balanced weights'. Herewith it provides necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether a TU-game has a population monotonic allocation scheme or not. Furthermore it shows that every 4-person integer valued game with a population monotonic allocation scheme has an integer valued population monotonic allocation scheme and it gives an example of a 7-person integer valued game that has only non-integer valued population monotonic allocation schemes.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 99.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200099

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans, 2002. "A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 322-343, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Moulin, H, 1990. "Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 219-32.

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Slikker, M. & Norde, H.W., 2008. "The Monoclus of a Coalitional Game," Discussion Paper 2008-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Jesus Fco. Getan Olivan & Jesus Montes & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2006. "On the monotonic core," Working Papers in Economics 155, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
Jesus Getan & Jesus Montes, 2008. "A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core," Working Papers in Economics 193, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.